We present three syntactic forcing models for coherent logic. These are based on sites whose underlying category only depends on the signature of the coherent theory, and they do not presuppose that the logic has equality. As an application we give a coherent theory T and a sentence ψ which is T -redundant (for any geometric implication ϕ, possibly with equality, if T + ψ ϕ, then T ϕ), yet false in the generic model of T . This answers in the negative a question by Wraith.
Introduction
Coherent logic concerns implications between positive formulas, those built up from atoms using only the connectives , ⊥, ∨, ∧ and ∃. A first-order theory T is coherent if it is axiomatized by sentences of the form ∀ x. ϕ → ψ where ϕ, ψ are positive formulas. Such sentences are also called coherent implications or coherent sentences.
1 Any coherent implication is equivalent to a finite conjunction of sentences of the form
where the ϕ i are conjunctions of atoms, and we can and will thus always assume that any coherent theory T is presented by axioms of this form. Coherent theories include all universal Horn theories. The axioms of equality are all coherent implications, and over logic with equality all algebraic theories, as well as the theories of fields and local rings, are coherent. Coherent implications form a Glivenko class, i.e., if a coherent implication is derivable from a coherent theory using classical logic, then it is already so derivable intuitionistically. Furthermore, they are preserved by the inverse image parts of geometric morphisms between toposes, and for every coherent theory T there is a generic model M T in a sheaf topos Set[T ], called the classifying topos of T , classifying models of T in any sheaf topos (cf. Section 4.1 for precise definitions). The geometric perspective offered by sheaf toposes also motivates the introduction of geometric theories, those axiomatized by geometric implications, i.e., implications between infinitary positive formulas, or equivalently, those with axioms of the form (1) where the disjunction is allowed to be infinite (as usual when dealing with infinitary fragments, we require that all formulas only have finitely many free variables). We assume the existence of a Grothendieck universe or some other means of talking about small sets. We then only consider infinitary conjunctions and disjunctions indexed by small sets.
The generic model of a coherent theory T can be thought of as a forcing model, and in this paper we present three other forcing models for coherent logic without equality, providing proofs of soundness and completeness. The models can be understood as living in certain sheaf toposes, and in a companion paper we shall characterize these as classifying toposes of certain geometric theories related to T .
A main goal of the current paper is to answer the following question of Wraith:
The problem of characterising all the non-geometric properties of a generic model appears to be difficult. If the generic model of a geometric theory T satisfies a sentence α then any geometric consequence of T + (α) has to be a consequence of T . We might call α T -redundant. Does the generic T -model satisfy all T -redundant sentences? [17, p. 336] We shall answer this in the negative, even for a coherent theory T . For the current volume in honour of Brouwer it is appropriate to clarify that the question makes constructive sense, and that our answer is constructive too. The proper understanding of Wraith's question requires a fair amount of categorical logic, which we develop in Section 2. For the construction of the generic model we rely on Coste and Coste [3] . These preparations postpone the proof of the negative answer to Wraith's question until the very last section of this paper. Therefore we find it useful to sketch this proof already here. We shall give a consistent coherent theory T and a sentence ψ such that both ψ and ¬ψ are T -redundant. Since the generic model of T cannot satisfy both ψ and ¬ψ, this provides a negative answer to Wraith's question. However, this answer is not as informative as one would hope: one would like to know which one of ψ and ¬ψ is true in the generic model of T . For this we have to take closer look at the argument why both ψ and ¬ψ are T -redundant.
Soundness for our forcing models means that every intuitionistic consequence (coherent or not, possibly with =) of T is forced. In fact, we prove soundness for all infinitary formulas, including all geometric implications. Geometric completeness means that any (generalized) geometric implication without = that is forced is an intuitionistic consequence of the coherent theory. Now let ψ be any sentence without = that is forced in any one of our models. Let ϕ be a geometric implication without = such that ψ → ϕ is intuitionistically provable in T . Then by soundness ψ → ϕ is forced, and hence ϕ is forced. Since ϕ is geometric without = it follows by geometric completeness that ϕ is provable in T without using ψ. A sentence like ψ is thus T -redundant in logic without equality. It can then be shown by a cut-elimination argument that ψ is also T -redundant in logic with equality.
The actual example we give of a coherent theory T and T -redundant sentences ψ and ¬ψ does not involve = and is moreover relational, that is, in a signature without functions. The T -redundancy follows from vs ψ and rn ¬ψ, using two of our forcing models. The final step in the constructive answer to Wraith's question is the observation that, due to the relational signature, vs exactly characterizes truth in the generic model of T . In other words, the example sentence ¬ψ is T -redundant, yet false in the generic model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall in a mostly selfcontained way some preliminaries on site models in sheaf toposes. Then in Section 3 we introduce our site models, which we then compare to the generic model in Section 4. We carry out a uniform completeness proof in Section 5, and we give examples in Section 6.
We would like to emphasize that although we include a fair amount of categorical logic in Sections 2 and 4, our forcing models and the accompanying soundness and completeness results can be understood without this machinery. Moreover, all results are constructively valid.
Preliminaries on sheaf toposes
We shall in this section briefly recall the main definitions and some auxiliary results concerning models in sheaf toposes. We refer to [8, 9] for detailed expositions.
We begin with the notion of a Grothendieck topology on a small category C and ways to present these. We write y : C → PSh(C) for the Yoneda embedding of C into the presheaf topos PSh(C) consisting of functors C op → Set: y(C) = Hom C (-, C). If P is a presheaf, f : D → C in C and x ∈ P (C), we write xf for the action P (f )(x) of f on x so that if also g :
A sieve on an object C is a subobject S ⊆ y(C) in PSh(C), viz., a collection of morphisms in C with codomain C closed under precomposition with arbitrary morphisms. A set of arrows U with codomain C is called a C-sink ; in particular, we think of sieves on C as certain C-sinks. For g : D → C a morphism with codomain C and S a C-sink, we define the D-sink g * (S) to be the set {h | cod(h) = D ∧ gh ∈ S}. This is a sieve whenever S is. Definition 2.1. A Grothendieck topology on C is a function J that assigns to every object C a collection J(C) of sieves on C, such that
(iii) (transitivity) if S ∈ J(C) and R is any sieve on C such that f
A category C with a Grothendieck topology is called a site. If U and V are C-sinks, we say that U refines V if every f ∈ U factors through some g ∈ V . A C-sink U is called a J-cover if there exists S ∈ J(C) refining U .
It is often useful to present a topology using a basis or a (saturated) coverage: Definition 2.2. A basis for a Grothendieck topology on a category C with finite limits consists of a relation between objects C of C and C-sinks U (if C U we say that U is a basic cover of C) such that the following conditions hold:
Here and below g * f is the pullback of f along g. In case C does not admit finite limits, we have to replace (ii) by a weaker condition, namely that of a coverage. A coverage on a small category C consists of a relation between objects C of C and C-sinks U such that (ii') if C U , and g : D → C, then there exists V D such that gV refines U .
If a coverage also satisfies the conditions (i) and (iii), then it will be called a saturated coverage.
2 Note that every basis is a saturated coverage by choosing V = {g
The reader may check that every saturated coverage generates a topology by letting J(C) consist of those S for which there exists U C such that U ⊆ S (i.e., U refines S, by the closure property of a sieve S).
Lemma 2.3. Let be a saturated coverage on C. If C U and C V , then U and V have a common refinement.
Proof. Let C U, V . By (ii') there exists for every g :
Then by (iii) we have g∈V gW g C refining both U and V per construction.
Definition 2.4. Let C be a category and U a C-sink for some C ∈ C. Write U = {f i : C i → C} i∈I . Let P : C op → Set be a presheaf. A compatible family of elements s i ∈ P (C i ) for U is one such that whenever g :
It is clear that if C has pullbacks, then it suffices to check compatibility at each pullback corner C i × C C j (it is of course necessary, too). A matching family for a sieve S is just a compatible family, but in this case it suffices to check that x f g = x f g for all f ∈ S and all g. This just amounts to a natural transformation S → P . Definition 2.5. A presheaf P : C op → Set is a sheaf for the coverage , if for every object C ∈ C, every U C, and every compatible family of elements (s f ) f ∈U for U , there exists a unique element s ∈ P (C) such that s f = sf for all f ∈ U .
By an adaptation of the argument of [9, Prop. III.4.1] we have for a coverage satisfying (iii) that P is a sheaf for iff P is a sheaf for the generated topology, in the sense that whenever S → yC is a covering sieve and S → P is a compatible family, there is a unique morphism yC → P (i.e., an element of P (C)) making the triangle commute:
Beware that this terminology is not quite standard: a "saturated coverage" is sometimes required to satisfy as well (iv) if U C refines a C-sink V , then already V C. Saturated coverages in this sense are in bijection with Grothendieck topologies. Definition 2.6. For a Grothendieck topology J or a saturated coverage on C, let Sh(C, J), resp. Sh(C, ), be the full subcategory of PSh(C) consisting of sheaves wrt. J, resp. . If J or can be inferred from the context, we just write Sh(C). A category equivalent to one of this form is called a Grothendieck topos or a sheaf topos.
Example 2.7. For any small category C, the topology J consisting just of the maximal sieves, J(C) = {t C }, is called the trivial topology. It is generated by the saturated coverage where U C if and only if U = {f } with f : C → C an isomorphism. In this way every presheaf is a sheaf, so PSh(C) = Sh(C), the presheaf topos, is indeed a sheaf topos.
The inclusion functor i : Sh(C, J) → PSh(C) has a left adjoint, a : PSh(C) → Sh(C, J), called the associated sheaf functor, cf. [9, Sect. III.5].
3 The unit of the adjunction η is a natural transformation with components η P : P → aP for each presheaf P (we write η for η P when no confusion can arise). Elements of aP (C) are given by equivalences classes of locally compatible families for covers U C: families of elements s i ∈ P (C i ) for each f i : C i → C in U such that for every i, j, and g : D → C i and h : D → C j such that f i g = f j h, the elements s i g = s j h are locally equal. The latter means that there is is a further cover V D such that s i gk = s j hk for every k ∈ V . Two locally compatible families are equivalent if they agree locally on a cover that refines the corresponding covers. More precisely, if s i ∈ P (C i ) and t j ∈ P (C j ) are locally compatible families for U C and V C, respectively, then they are equivalent if there exists W C refining both U and V , such that for all h : D → C in W and any way h factors through U and through V , say h = f i h i = g j h j with f i ∈ U and g j ∈ V , we have that s i h i and t j h j are locally equal in D. Note that the particular i and j depend on the factorization and that there is at least one of each for each h.
Geometric morphisms
The natural notion of a morphism between sheaf toposes E, F is that of a geometric morphism F : E → F. This is a pair of adjoint functors,
such that F * preserves finite limits. Here, F * is called the inverse image functor and F * is called the direct image functor. The geometric morphisms from E to F form a category, Hom(E, F) where the morphisms are natural transformations between the inverse image parts (or equivalently between the direct image parts in the opposite direction). Cf., e.g., Chapter VII of [9] for more information about geometric morphisms.
The first example of a geometric morphism is the inclusion of the sheaf topos into the presheaf topos on a site C, (a i) : Sh(C) → PSh(C). The direct image functor is the inclusion functor and the inverse image functor is the associated sheaf functor, which is indeed left exact (in particular, it preserves monomorphisms).
We now wish to consider geometric morphisms between sheaf toposes induced by functors between the underlying sites. Recall that any functor F : C → D between small categories induces adjunctions
Here, F * is just composition with F , while F ! and F * are the left and right Kan extensions along F . Since F * is a right adjoint, it preserves all limits, so the pair (F * F * ) gives a geometric morphism F : PSh(C) → PSh(D). We first consider the conditions under which this induces a geometric morphism F : Sh(C) → Sh(D) when C and D are sites. Covering lifting property For any cover V F (C) in D with C ∈ C, there is a cover
The following result is essentially [8, C2.3 .18], where the above property is called cover-reflecting (see also [9, Theorem VII.10.5]). 
Sometimes a functor F : C → D induces a geometric morphism Sh(D) → Sh(C) in a contravariant way via the adjoint pair (F ! F * ). In this case, the left exactness of F ! is not automatic, which is one reason the corresponding definition has two components: Definition 2.11. A functor F : C → D between sites is a morphism of sites if it satisfies the following two properties:
Cover preserving If U C in C, then there is a cover V F C refining F (U ).
Covering-flat If A : I → C is a finite diagram in C, then every cone over F A factors locally through the F -image of a cone over A.
The notion of being covering-flat can be slightly strengthened by removing the word "locally" from the definition. A functor satisfying this condition is called representably flat. Of course, if C and D have finite limits and F preserves them, then F is representably flat, and a fortiori covering-flat. See also the discussion in [15] , where we find: Theorem 2.12. If F : C → D is a morphism of sites, then there is geometric morphism Sh(D) → Sh(C) whose direct image functor is the restriction of F * : PSh(D) → PSh(C) to sheaves.
Structures for a signature
We fix a first-order signature Σ throughout the sequel. We give all definitions for the case of a single-sorted signature, leaving the details concerning the many-sorted case to the reader. Definition 2.13. A structure for Σ in a sheaf topos Sh(C, J) consists of a sheaf M (the carrier) together with morphisms f M : M n → M for every n-ary function symbol, and subobjects of M n denoted P M → M n for every n-ary predicate symbol. The latter two are often left implicit when we speak about a structure or model M .
A homomorphism of Σ-structures is a morphisms g : M → M that respects the interpretations of function and predicate symbols.
Any formula ϕ( x) with free variables among the x = x 1 , . . . , x n , gives rise to a subobject ϕ( x) M → M n , defined by recursion on the structure of ϕ using the structure ingredients in the base cases. This semantics has an explicit description in terms of the forcing relation: Definition 2.14. Given an object C ∈ C and a tuple of elements α ∈ M (C) n = M n (C). If ϕ( x) is a formula with n free variables, then we say that C forces ϕ(α), denoted C M ϕ(α), iff α factors through ϕ( x) → M n , where we consider α as a map ayC → M n .
The forcing relation enjoys the following two properties:
We now have the following result, which is a slight variation of [9, Theorem VI.7.1], using the fact that any cover for a topology generated by a saturated coverage is refined by a cover in the coverage (by definition).
Theorem 2.15. Given a structure M in a sheaf topos Sh(C, ), where is a saturated coverage on C, we have:
• C M always;
• C M ⊥ iff there is a cover U C with U empty;
For a sentence ϕ, we write M ϕ if C M ϕ for all C ∈ C. Of course, if C has a terminal object 1, then this is equivalent to 1 M ϕ. For future use we record the following refinements of the quantifier cases of Theorem 2.15.
Lemma 2.17. If M = aP for some presheaf P , then we have for every α : ayC → M n :
Furthermore, if P = yD is representable and C has finite products, then:
Proof. The first points follow from local character of forcing, together with the fact that every element of aP (C ) is locally of the form η P (γ) for some γ ∈ P (C ) (and transitivity of covers in the case of the existential quantifier). The last point is Remark VI.7.2 in [9] .
If f : E → F is a geometric morphism of sheaf toposes, and M ∈ F is a model of a coherent theory T , then f * M is a model of T in E. This illustrates the important relationship between coherent (and more generally, geometric) theories and toposes and geometric morphisms. We shall return to this relationship in the next subsection and in Section 4.
Generalized geometric implications
The following variation on the class of geometric implications will be used in our completeness proofs in Section 5.
Definition 2.18. The class of generalized geometric implications is generated by the following grammar:
where I ranges over small index sets and α ::= p( t ) | | ⊥ | (s = t) is an atomic formula.
Note that geometric implications are not strictly speaking generalized geometric implications, but easy equivalents can be obtained via the equivalence of
Also note that there are (even finitary) generalized geometric implications that are not equivalent to any geometric implication, e.g., p ∨ (p → ⊥) for atomic p.
Among first-order formulas, the generalized geometric implications are up to equivalence those that do not contain negative occurrences of implications nor of universal quantifiers, cf. [11, Theorem 3.2] where the term generalized geometric implications refers to first-order formulas.
Theorem 2.19. Let F : E → F be a geometric morphism, and M ∈ F a Σ-structure. For any generalized geometric implication ϕ in variables x 1 , . . . , x n , we have an inclusion of subobjects of (
In particular, if ϕ is a sentence and ϕ M = , then ϕ F * M = .
Proof. By induction on ϕ. The inverse image functor preserves atomic formulas, conjunction, disjunction, and existential quantification. Hence it remains to consider implication and universal quantification. Note that if f : P → Q is any morphism in F and A a subobject of P , then (17)]. And if B is another subobject of P , then implication can be expressed as (A ⇒ B) = ∀ a (A ∧ B), where a : A → P is the inclusion of the subobject
. For an implication α → ϕ, we now have
using the fact that atomic formulas are preserved. The case for a universal quantifier is similar.
Categories of forcing conditions
In this section we define three categories of forcing conditions and do the groundwork for their sheaf toposes based on a coherent theory T without equality. We assume a fixed but arbitrary signature Σ of a first-order language. Phrases like term, atom, formula, sentence refer to the well known syntactic entities. Let X = {x 0 , x 1 , . . .} be a countably infinite set of variables; metavariables x, y, z range over X. Let Tm(X) denote the set of Σ-terms over X ⊆ X.
Definition 3.1. The category C ts has objects denoted as pairs (X; A), where X is a finite subset of X and A is a finite set of atoms in the language defined by Σ and X. The latter means that only variables from X may occur in A. Such pairs (X; A) are called conditions. The morphisms of C ts are denoted as f : (Y ; B) → (X; A), where f is a term substitution X → Tm(Y ) such that Af ⊆ B. Here and below, Af denotes the application of the substitution f to A.
Clearly, C ts is a category. We have id (X;A) : (X; A) → (X; A) with underlying function the inclusion X → Tm(X). If f : (Z; C) → (Y ; B) and g : (Y ; B) → (X; A), then g • f : (Z; C) → (X; A) is defined by the composition of substitutions gf : X → Tm(Z) which sends a variable x ∈ X to the term xgf ∈ Tm(Z). Here and below we use diagram composition for the substitutions underlying the morphisms. This works well in combination with postfixing substitutions: A(g • f ) = A(gf ) = (Ag)f , where one can read gf both as the ordinary composition of morphisms and as the diagram composition of the underlying substitutions.
Conditions will be denoted as, e.g., (x, y, z; p(z), q(f (x), z, z)). Substitutions will be denoted as, e.g., [y := x, z := g(x)]. The category C ts has a terminal object (; ) with unique morphisms [] : (X; A) → (; ).
Definition 3.2. The category C vs is the subcategory of C ts that has the same objects but in which the morphisms f : (Y ; B) → (X; A) are required to be variable substitutions. These are simply functions X → Y thought of as functions X → Tm(Y ).
Note that if the signature is purely relational, then the categories C ts and C vs coincide. Definition 3.3. The category C rn is the subcategory of C vs that has the same objects but in which the morphisms are required to be injective (when considered as functions between sets of variables). Such variable substitutions are commonly called renamings, whence the subscripts in C vs , C rn . Discussion 3.4. The above definitions clearly take the nominal approach to conditions. In the nominal approach it is important to avoid name conflicts. Also, the nominal approach gives rise to many isomorphisms, such as between (x 0 ; p(x 0 )) and (x 1 ; p(x 1 )). Such isomorphisms do no harm, but are not very useful either. Alternatively, it would be possible to take X = N and use de Bruijn indices [1] . The two conditions above would then become one condition (1; p(0)). In the approach with de Bruijn indices the conditions are of the form (n; A) with all numbers occurring in A less than n. Morphisms (m; B) → (n; A) are functions f : [n] → Tm([m]) such that Af ⊆ B. Here [k] denotes the set {0, . . . , k − 1}, for each k ∈ N. With de Bruijn indices there are no name conflicts. However, de Bruijn-indices are more difficult to read and we shall only use them to resolve name conflicts. Discussion 3.5. In the above definitions we assumed the language to be single-sorted, and we shall write most of the paper under this assumption, though very little would have to change to accommodate multiple sorts. In this case, a condition (X; A) would consist of a finite set X of sorted variables, and a finite set of atoms with variables from X, and morphisms would be sort-respecting (injective, variable, term) substitutions.
Finite limits
Both C vs and C rn inherit the terminal object (; ) from C ts . In this section we show that C vs actually has all finite limits. We also note that C ts has all finite products. However, neither C ts nor C rn have equalizers: For C ts , consider the two arrows To see that C vs has all finite limits, it suffices to check that in addition to a terminal object it has pullbacks. So let (Y ; B) To see that C ts has all finite products, consider the square (2) in the case where (X; A) is the terminal object (; ) and W is then the disjoint union of X and Y .
Coverages
Recall that a coherent theory T has an axiomatization in which every axiom is of the form
where the ϕ i are conjunctions of atoms.
Definition 3.6. Let T be a coherent theory. We define an inductively generated relation T as in Definition 2.2 for the category C rn . Since C rn is a subcategory of C ts and C vs containing all isomorphisms, we have then also defined relations T for C ts and C vs . In Theorem 3.8 we will verify that T is a saturated coverage for all three categories, and even a basis for a Grothendieck topology on C vs .
f is an isomorphism with codomain (X; A)
Here ( * ) is the set of conditions sanctioning the application of the rule: the existence of an instance ϕ 0 → ∃ x 1 .ϕ 1 ∨ · · · ∨ ∃ x n .ϕ n of an axiom in T with all free variables in X and ϕ 0 ⊆ A. We tacitly assume that name conflicts are avoided, either by using de Bruijn indices, or by renaming the bound variables x i so that they are disjoint from X. The morphisms e i : (X, x i ; A, ϕ i ) → (X; A) restrict to identities on X, and e i U i denotes the collection of morphisms e i f with f ∈ U i . This completes ( * ) and the definition of T .
Lemma 3.7. Let T be a coherent theory and T the relation as in Definition 3.6. If (X; A) T U , then (Y ; B) T f U for every isomorphism f : (X; A) → (Y ; B).
Proof. Since T is fixed, we drop the subscript in T . By induction on the definition of (X; A) U . The base case is trivial, since composition preserves isomorphisms. For the induction step, consider
and assume the lemma holds for the premises of the rule. Let f : (X; A) → (Y ; B) be an iso. We prove the desired result by the following inference:
Here every f i : (X, 
We may waive name conflicts since we could have used de Bruijn indices. It remains to prove f e i U i = e i f i U i for all i. This follows since, basically, the e i do nothing on X, the e i do nothing on Y , and the f i extend f (actually, we have f e i = e i f i ).
Theorem 3.8. Let T be a coherent theory and T the relation as in Definition 3.6. The relation T is a saturated coverage for any of the categories C rn , C vs ,C ts and a basis for a Grothendieck topology on C vs .
Proof. Since T is fixed, we drop the subscript in T . We have to verify conditions (i), (ii') and (iii) in Definition 2.2. Condition (i) holds as per definition of the base case of T . We do (iii) before (ii') since (iii) is easier. We prove (iii) by induction on the definition of C U . The base case, where U = {f } for some isomorphism f , is Lemma 3.7, which holds for all three C rn , C vs , C ts . For the induction step, consider
and assume (iii) holds for the premises of the rule. Assume
, and we can use C ij V ij also for f ij . Hence by the induction hypothesis (X, x i ; A, ϕ i )
With these covers in hand we prove the desired result by the following inference:
A routine verification shows that indeed
which completes the proof of (iii). We continue with (ii'), which we again prove by induction on the definition of C U . In the base case we have that C {f } for some isomorphism f :
Then it suffices to show that g = g id D factors through f . This is immediate since g = (g k)f = g(kf ) for the inverse k of f . For the induction step, consider:
and assume (ii') holds for the premises of the rule. Let g : (Y ; B) → (X; A) and define
By the induction hypothesis there exist V i (Y, x i ; B, ϕ i g) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n with exactly the properties we need. Now consider the following inference:
One could say that this inference is the pullback along g of the previous one. Like in the proof of Lemma 3.7 one easily verifies ( * ). We define V = 1≤i≤n (e i V i ) and the following commutative diagram (3) shows that V has the desired properties.
We have now proved (i), (ii') and (iii) uniformly for C rn , C vs , C ts . We proceed to the proof of (ii) for C vs , which is very similar to the proof above of (ii'). Again we use induction on the definition of C U . In the base case we have that C {f } for some isomorfism f : C → C. We put V = {g * f } and get D V as pullback preserves isos. In the induction step the only differences with the proof of (ii') are: the covers V i = {g * i f i | f i ∈ U i } obtained by the induction hypothesis, and the diagram (3), which is now a pullback diagram since the subdiagrams are pullbacks.
Canonical models
We have now defined, for any fixed coherent theory T , sheaf toposes Sh(C, ) for C = C ts , C vs , C rn , and we proceed to define a canonical model of T in each of these. Definition 3.9. Let Tm denote the presheaf of terms over the signature in each PSh(C ), so Tm(X; A) is the set of terms with parameters in X. Note that for C ts we have Tm ∼ = y(x; ), but not for C vs , C rn . Now let M := a Tm denote the associated sheaf.
If f is an n-ary function symbol, define f : M n → M by applying the associated sheaf functor to the natural transformation Tm n → Tm that maps n terms t i at a condition (X; A) to the term f (t 1 , . . . , t n ).
If p is an n-ary predicate symbol, define p as the associated sheaf of the subpresheaf of Tm n that at a condition (X; A) consists of those tuples (t 1 , . . . , t n ) for which p(t 1 , . . . , t n ) ∈ A.
Remark 3.10. By the definition of the associated sheaf functor in terms of locally compatible families, this means that every element α ∈ M (X; A) is locally a term: there is a cover U (X; A) such that for every f : (Y ; B) → (X; A) in U , αf = η(t) for some t ∈ Tm(Y ; B), and such a family of terms defines an element of M (X; A) if it is locally compatible.
Likewise, the elements α 1 , . . . , α n ∈ M (X; A) satisfy (X; A) M p(α 1 , . . . , α n ) for p an n-ary predicate symbol, if and only if there is a cover U (X; A) such that for every f : (Y ; B) → (X; A) in U , we have α i f = η(t i ) for some terms t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ Tm(Y ; B) and p(t 1 , . . . , t n ) ∈ B.
Note in particular that (X; A) M ϕ if ϕ ⊆ A when ϕ is a conjunction of atoms (here and in the sequel we elide the difference between a term t and the corresponding element η(t)). Regarding the canonical interpretation of equality, if s, t ∈ Tm(X; A), then (X; A) M s = t iff there is a cover U (X; A) such that sf = tf for all f : (Y ; B) → (X; A) in U .
We need to check that these structures M actually give models of T . Consider an axiom of T :
which we take to be closed, where the ϕ i are conjunctions of atoms. We must show (; ) M ϕ, which by Theorem 2.15 amounts to showing for any condition (X; A) and any instantiation of x over X such that the atoms in ϕ 0 lie in A, we have
To construct a suitable cover of (X; A) we use the same instantiation in the step case of Definition 3.6 and obtain a cover {e i } 1≤i≤k (X; A) using identity covers in the premises. Indeed, for each i we have (X,
with the identity instantiation of the x i because (X, x i ; A, ϕ i ) M ϕ i .
Comparison with the classifying topos
In this section we first recall in Subsection 4.1 some background on classifying toposes as well as a convenient presentation due to Coste and Coste [3] . We then prove that for a purely relational signature, Sh(C vs , T ) is the classifying topos of T . In Subsection 4.2 we study the geometric morphisms between the sheaf toposes corresponding to our sites.
Classifying toposes
The theory of classifying toposes is based on theories in logic with equality, so we need to connect theories in logic without equality to ones in logic with equality. Given a coherent theory T in logic without equality, let T = denote T expanded with an equality relation and the (coherent) axioms ensuring this is a congruence with respect to the signature.
To discuss classifying toposes, let now T be a coherent theory in logic with equality (in particular, the signature contains = and all equality axioms are assumed). Let Mod T (E) denote the category of models of T in E and homomorphisms between them. By the remark at the end of Section 2.2, Mod T (E) depends on E in a contravariant way for a coherent theory T , as the inverse image part of a geometric morphism carries T -models to T -models. Given T , the classifying topos and the generic model are by this universal property uniquely determined up to unique equivalence and isomorphism. 4 When T is a coherent theory in logic without equality, we say that a topos is a classifying topos for T if it is a classifying topos for T = . This makes sense because any model of T in a topos E is uniquely also a model of T = in the sense of logic with equality, as equality must be interpreted by the equality of E.
There are several possible constructions of the classifying topos of a coherent theory T (in logic with equality). We shall use a presentation that goes back to [3, p. 25] , where the classifying topos is constructed relative to a subtheory T 0 that is required to be strict universal Horn, i.e., consisting only of axioms of the form (the universal closure of) ϕ 1 ∧· · ·∧ϕ n → ψ, where the ϕ i and ψ are atomic formulas. 5 The site is based on a category called the syntactic site of T 0 , C 0 . This has as objects pairs (X; A) where X is a finite set of variables, and A is a set of facts which may now include equalities. The morphisms (X; A) → (Y ; B) are equivalence classes of term substitutions f : Y → Tm(X) such that T 0 together with the facts in A proves the facts in Bf . Two term substitutions f, g are equivalent if T 0 together with A proves yf = yg for each y ∈ Y . 6 Note that C 0 is a category with all finite limits (by an argument similar to that of [8, D1.4 
.2]).
The theorem of [3, p. 25 ] (see also Proposition D3.1.10 of [8] ) can now be phrased as follows:
Theorem 4.2. The classifying topos T can be presented as Sh(C 0 , T ), where T is generated as in Definition 3.6 using the axioms of T not in T 0 . The generic model is M T = ay(x; ). Theorem 4.3. For a purely relational signature, Sh(C vs , T ) is canonically equivalent to the classifying topos of T = .
Proof. Let C 0 be the syntactic site from [3] over the base theory of equality (eq) in the signature of T = .
One difference between C vs and C 0 is that the objects of the latter may contain equality atoms. By the assumption on the signature, equality atoms are all of the form x = y. These can easily be eliminated via isomorphisms (X; A, x = x) → (X; A) and (X, y; A, x = y) → (X; A[y := x]). Adopting a standardized procedure for eliminating equality atoms thus yields that the canonical fully faithful functor from C vs to C 0 is an equivalence of categories. By induction on the definition of C T U one proves that the equivalence preserves covers both ways. Hence, the sites C vs and C 0 give equivalent sheaf toposes, Sh(C vs , T ) Sh(C 0 , T ). Now apply Theorem 4.2.
In a forthcoming paper we shall characterize the sheaf toposes Sh(C x , T ) as the classifying toposes of certain extensions of the coherent theory T . As a preview, we note that when the signature contains function symbols, Sh(C vs , T ) and the classifying topos of T = can be quite different, cf. Example 6.2 below.
Comparison morphisms
Let us note that the toposes we have considered are related by a series of geometric morphisms. Consider the string of canonical faithful functors
where C 0 is the syntactic site of the theory of equality (eq) in the signature of T = (using either of the presentations given in Section 4.1). Giving each of these categories the coverage corresponding to a coherent theory T , all the functors have the covering lifting property, so we get a corresponding string of geometric morphisms
ending with the classifying topos for T (using Theorem 4.2).
Theorem 4.4. The inverse image functors map canonical models to canonical models.
Proof. Recall that the canonical models are given by a Tm for C rn and C vs and ay(x; ) in C ts and C 0 . Note by Lemma 2.10, we can compute the inverse image of these associated sheaves by taking the inverse image of the presheaf and then sheafifying. Now, for C ∈ C ts we have k * (y(x; ))(C) = y(x; )(kC) = Hom C 0 (kC, (x; )) Hom Cts (C; (x; )) = y(x; )(C), using that k is full as well as faithful. Thus, k * (ay(x; )) ay(x; ) in Sh(C ts ). Then, for C ∈ C vs we have j * (y(x; ))(C) = Hom Cts (C, (x; )) Tm(C), so j * (ay(x; )) a Tm in Sh(C vs ).
Finally, for C ∈ C rn we have i * Tm(C) Tm(C), so i * (a Tm) a Tm in Sh(C rn ).
We see that the compositions through to Sh(C 0 ) in (4) witness that the canonical models are models of T .
Since i, j and k preserve covers, we can consider whether they are also covering-flat and thus morphisms of sites, cf. Theorem 2.12.
Theorem 4.5. The inclusion functor j : C vs → C ts is representably flat, and thus (j ! j * ) gives rise to a geometric morphism from Sh(C ts ) to Sh(C vs ).
The composite kj : C vs → C 0 preserves finite limits, and there is thus an induced geometric morphism from Sh(C 0 ) to Sh(C vs ).
Proof. We first need to show that for any finite diagram d in C vs , any cone over d in C ts factors through some cone over d in C vs . But C vs has finite limits, and we see from their explicit description in Section 3.1 that any cone over d in C ts factors through the limiting cone of d in C vs . The second statement is clear.
The considerations in the beginning of Section 3.1 that show that C rn and C ts fail to have equalizers also show that i and k need not be covering-flat (take an empty theory for instance).
One might hope that the morphisms in (4) are open, meaning that the inverse image parts preserve first-order logic. For empty theories the coverages are trivial, and the toposes are presheaf toposes. However, we have from [7, Proposition 2.6] 
We construct counterexamples as follows: for i : C rn → C vs let α identify two variables; for j : C vs → C ts let α be any non-variable term substitution; for k : C ts → C 0 let D contain an equation. Thus, in general none of the morphisms in (4) are open.
Soundness and Completeness
In this section we prove for each of the canonical models in Sh(C rn ), Sh(C vs ) and Sh(C ts ): soundness for a class of formulas that includes both first order intuitionistic formulas and (infinitary) geometric implications, and completeness for generalized geometric implications.
We write for rn , vs and ts for the forcing relations M for the canonical models M in C rn , C vs and C ts , respectively, or even just when the category can be inferred from the context. If C = (X; A) is a condition, we write Fact(C) = A for the set of facts in C. In Definition 3.9 we introduced the notation Tm(C) for the set of terms with free variables in X.
We can reformulate Theorem 2.15 as a definition, referring only to actual terms (rather than locally compatible families of terms), thus giving a forcing relation between conditions and formulas which can be understood without any sheaf or topos machinery.
Definition 5.1. Let C be one of the categories C rn , C vs or C ts and let be any coverage on C. For any condition C = (X; A) and any formula ϕ with free variables in X we define the forcing relation C ϕ by induction on ϕ as follows:
3. C ϕ if ϕ is a fact and there is U C with ϕf ∈ Fact(D) for all f :
Theorem 5.2. If we take to be T as in Definition 3.6, then this definition of agrees with the one for the canonical model as in Definition 2.14 for all formulas.
Proof. This follows from local character in the base case, and Theorem 2.15 in the other cases, together with Lemma 2.17 in the quantifier cases.
Remark 5.3. If we add to Definition 5.1 the clause 9. C s = t if there is a cover U C with sf = tf for all f : D → C in U , then Theorem 5.2 remains true when the interpretation of equality for M is the equality of the corresponding topos. We can thus reason about equality in the canonical models even though T is a theory in logic without equality. However, our completeness theorem below does not hold for sentences formulated in logic with equality. Below we shall describe what happens for sentences with = via a suitable extension of T .
The only difference between the forcing relations of Definitions 2.14 and 5.1 is thus that the former is defined for a wider class of formulas, namely those containing locally compatible families of terms in place of ordinary terms. But by local character, we can always reduce to the case of ordinary terms and formulas.
Having established Theorem 5.2, we inherit the properties of monotonicity and local character also for the forcing relation of Definition 5.1.
Sometimes, the case of the universal quantifier simplifies as follows.
Lemma 5.4. For C ts , and hence in case of a purely relational signature also for C vs , we have for all conditions (X; A) and formulas ϕ (possibly with =) that (X; A) ∀x.ϕ iff (X, x; A) ϕ.
Proof. This is just the last point of Lemma 2.17 since the assumptions imply that M = ay(x; ) and the product of (X; A) with (x; ) is (X, x; A) (we may assume x / ∈ X). We can also give a direct proof as follows:
The left to right direction is immediate using the inclusion X → X ∪ {x}. For the other direction, assume (X, x; A) ϕ and let f : (Y ; B) → (X; A) in C ts be given together with a term t ∈ Tm(Y ; B). We then have a commutative triangle
so (Y ; B) ϕ[f, x := t] by monotonicity. In case of C vs with a purely relational signature, t is a variable in Y and we can use the same commutative triangle.
Note that in the case of C rn and a purely relational signature this argument would fail in the case of t being a variable in the image of f , because [f, x := t] would be not be injective.
We mentioned already in Section 2 that the forcing semantics is sound with respect to intuitionistic provability. Let us here note that this is with respect to provability that handles an empty domain in a correct way. For example, let T be the empty theory over a signature containing a constant c. Consider the trivial covering defined by (; ) {id (;) : (; ) → (; )}. We have (; ) [x = c], so by the definition of forcing (; ) ∃x. . The latter does not hold if the signature does not contain a constant. This means that we have to use a logic that is careful about ∃-introduction, so that ∃x. is not provable if there is no constant in the signature. Similar care has to be taken in connection with ∀. Proof systems that can handle empty domains can be found in [6, 8, 10, 14] . One way is to define triples Γ X ϕ where X is a set of variables and Γ, ϕ are formulas with all free variables in X. The rules for the propositional connectives are as usual, and the rules for the quantifiers are as follows.
1. Γ X ∀x.ϕ if Γ X,x ϕ and x not free in Γ 2. Γ X ∃x.ϕ if Γ X ϕ[x := t] and t ∈ Tm(X) 3. Γ X ϕ[x := t] if Γ X ∀x.ϕ and t ∈ Tm(X) Lemma 5.7. Let C be one of the categories C rn , C vs or C ts and T a coherent theory with corresponding coverage relation . Assume (X; A) U and let formula ψ with all free variables in X be such that for all f : (Y ; B) → (X; A) in U we have T, B Y ψf . Then T, A X ψ.
Proof. By induction on (X; A)
U . The base case is trivial since the substitution underlying an isomorphism is a bijective renaming. For the induction step, let (X; A) U be inferred by (X,
By induction hypotheses it follows for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n that T, A, ϕ i X, x i ψ (e i does nothing on X, so ψ = ψe i ). The axiom used to infer (X; A) U yields T, A X ∃ x 1 .ϕ 1 ∨ · · · ∨ ∃ x k .ϕ k . Note that the x i do not occur in T, A, ψ, so from case distinction and existential elimination it follows that T, A X ψ.
Now we come to our first completeness result, and here it is imperative that equality is not present in the language. The induction step for ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 is obvious. Assume the result has been proven for ϕ i for i ∈ I (IH), and let (X; A) i∈I ϕ i . Then there exists U (X; A) such that for any f : (Y ; B) → (X; A) in U we have (Y ; B) ϕ i f for some i ∈ I. By the induction hypothesis we get for every f in U that T, B Y ϕ i f for some i ∈ I, and hence T, B Y i∈I ϕ i f . Now T, A X i∈I ϕ i follows by Lemma 5.7 .
Assume the result has been proven for ϕ (IH), and let (X; A) ∀x. ϕ. Then (X, x; A) ϕ, so by the induction hypothesis we get T, A X,x ϕ, and hence T, A X ∀x. ϕ since x does not occur in T, A.
Again assume the result has been proven for ϕ (IH), and let (X; A) ∃x. ϕ. Assume the result has been proven for α and ϕ (IH), and let (X; A) α → ϕ. We have to prove T, A X α → ϕ, and it clearly suffices to prove that T, A, α X ϕ. The latter follows easily from the induction hypothesis for ϕ, the definition of forcing, and the fact that id X : (X; A, α) → (X; A). Remark 5.10. The completeness result depends crucially on the fact that the forcing conditions do not allow equality facts. E.g., ¬(0 = 1) is forced but not provable, for the empty theory with two constants, 0 and 1; cf. Example 6.2 below.
To capture the coherent implications with = that hold in our forcing models, we let T + denote T = together with the following (coherent) constructor axioms ensuring all function symbols behave like constructors:
(II) function symbols are injective:
(III) there are no proper cycles: x = f ( s) → ⊥ whenever x occurs anywhere in the sequence of terms s.
It is easy to see that these are all forced in our three models, which thus model T + . Observe that the base case in the proof of Theorem 5.8 also holds with α an equality atom and T a coherent theory in logic with equality. (The induction step α → ϕ fails with α an equality atom since such α's are not allowed in conditions.) As a consequence, Theorem 5.8 also holds for coherent theories T + and geometric implications with =, as long as the latter have no equations in a negative position. This allows us to handle geometric sentences (but not all generalized geometric implications) using the (admissible) Eriksson-Girard elimination rule for equality, i.e., the inference Proof. Any geometric sentence over the signature of T + is equivalent to a conjunction of sentences of the form ∀ x. s = t → ψ, where ψ is a generalized geometric implication without any equations in an antecedent.
If the equations s = t are not unifiable, then T + ∅ ∀ x. s = t → ⊥, and we are done. Otherwise, let f : X → Tm(Y ) be the most general unifier. From
we get (Y ; ) ( s = t)f → ψf simply by using the term substitution f as instantiation for x. Since f unifies s = t, we get (Y ; ) ψf . By the restriction on ψ, we get T + Y ψf from Theorem 5.8. By the Girard-Eriksson rule we conclude T + , s = t X ψ, as desired.
Remark 5.12. Because we assume our theory T to be coherent (viz., finitary geometric), we note that in the completeness results, Theorem 5.8 and Corollary 5.9, the resulting proof is always finitary as well, by analyzing the rules used. Thus, if in Theorem 5.11, ϕ has the form (1) (where the disjunction is allowed to be infinite), then the proof obtained there is finitary.
We shall see in the companion paper that Sh(C ts , T ) is in fact the classifying topos of T + . As a hint for what happens for the model over C rn , note that the generalized geometric implication ∀x, y. x = y ∨ (x = y → ⊥) is forced there, so we cannot hope to extend Theorem 5.11 to generalized geometric implications for this model.
Examples
Example 6.1. Consider the empty single-sorted signature with the theory {∃x. } (axiomatizing an inhabited domain). In this case, C vs is equivalent to Fin op (the opposite of the category of finite sets and functions) and C rn is equivalent to Fin op mon (the opposite of the category of finite sets and injections). By Theorem 4.3 we have that Sh(C vs ) is the classifying topos of the theory {∃x. } = , or, in categorical terminology, for an inhabited object. The coverage on C rn includes all singleton sinks, as any injection between finite sets is a composition of finitely many embeddings that each add one element with a bijection. Hence the generated Grothendieck topology is the atomic one consisting of all inhabited sieves, and we get that Sh(C rn ) is the Schanuel topos, classifying infinite decidable objects, cf. [17, p. 335 ]. This example shows that the toposes Sh(C rn ) and Sh(C vs ) need not be equivalent.
Example 6.2. Consider the empty theory over the signature consisting of two constant symbols 0 and 1. Since the theory is empty, the Grothendieck topology of any of the sites considered in this example is trivial, so that Example 2.7 applies to any of these sites. Using [3, p. 25] , the classifying topos can be presented as PSh(C 0 ), where C 0 is the syntactic site, see Section 4.1. Mapping any object (X; A) of C 0 to the set X ∪ {0, 1} modulo the equalities implied by A, it is easy to see that C 0 is equivalent to Fin op 01 (the opposite of the category of finite bi-pointed sets), and this topos classifies a bi-pointed object. Meanwhile, C vs and C rn are impervious to the constants, so Sh(C vs ) = PSh(C vs ) is the object classifier and Sh(C rn ) = PSh(C rn ) classifies decidable objects [8, D3.2.7] . Spitters [16] noted that Sh(C ts ) classifies strictly bi-pointed objects (note also that C ts is equivalent to Fin op 0 =1 : the opposite of the category of finite strictly bi-pointed sets). This example shows that all of these toposes can be different (viz. non-equivalent). Indeed, consider the string of geometric morphisms (4) in this case ([C, D] denotes the functor category):
Here, Fin → Fin 0 =1 is the functor that freely adjoins two new elements 0 and 1. The forgetful functors from Fin 0 =1 and Fin 01 to Fin induce the geometric morphisms from PSh(C ts ) and PSh(C 0 ) to PSh(C vs ) mentioned in Theorem 4.5; these classify the generic (strictly) bi-pointed object as an object.
Regarding the canonical models, we have in PSh(C 0 ) that ¬¬0 = 1 using (X; A, 0 = 1) → (X; A), while in PSh(C ts ), PSh(C vs ) and PSh(C rn ) we have ¬0 = 1.
In PSh(C ts ) we have ∀x.¬¬(x = 0 ∨ x = 1), while in PSh(C vs ) we have on the other hand ¬∀x.¬¬(x = 0 ∨ x = 1). To see this, use that Tm(X) consists of 0, 1 and x ∈ X, plus that the term substitution [x := 0] can be used in C ts but not in C vs .
In PSh(C vs ) we have ¬∀xy. x = y ∨ ¬x = y, while we have ∀xy. x = y ∨ ¬x = y in PSh(C rn ) using Tm(X) as above plus the fact that in C vs two distinct variables can be substituted with one variable, whereas in C rn they must remain distinct.
To sum up, these considerations show that the canonical models in these toposes are different, at least with respect to sentences formulated in logic with equality (and we also get a new proof that the morphisms in (4) need not be open).
To show that the toposes are actually different (i.e., non-equivalent), we can use the result that if C is idempotent complete, then it can be recovered up to equivalence from the presheaf topos PSh(C) [8, Lemma A1.1.10]. Now note that the four categories Fin mon , Fin, Fin 0 =1 , Fin 01 (and their opposites) are all idempotent complete and pairwise nonequivalent. Hence the above presheaf toposes are also pairwise non-equivalent. Now we turn to purely relational signatures and show that also there we find examples of (non-coherent) sentences that are forced but not provable, not even classically.
Example 6.3. Let T be the empty theory over a signature with one unary predicate P . Then the formula ∀x.P (x) is never forced. (X; A) ∀x.P (x) means by the definition of forcing that D P (t) for all g : D → (X; A) and t ∈ Tm(D). Since the theory is empty, we only have D {f }, for any isomorphism f : E → D, and no other covers. Now take D = (X, y; A) with y not in X, and g the identity substitution on X. Clearly, there is no isomorphism f : E → D such that P (y)f ∈ Af , so not D P (y) and hence not (X; A) ∀x.P (x). Since ∀x.P (x) is never forced, we get that (∀x.P (x)) → ⊥ is forced by any condition. However, this formula is not classically provable from T .
The argument of the previous example plays an important role in the next, more interesting example, which reveals a difference between forcing based on C rn and on C vs . Lemma 6.4. Let T be the theory with one axiom ∀x, z. P (x) → (Q(x, z) ∨ R(x, z)) over the minimal relational signature in which this axiom can be expressed. Let ϕ := ∃x, y. (P (x) ∧ P (y) ∧ ¬∀z. (Q(x, z) ∨ R(y, z))).
Then vs ¬ϕ, and rn ¬¬ϕ.
Proof. We note first that ⊥ does not occur in T . By a simple induction on the definition of C U one can therefore construct an f ∈ U for every U C ( ), so we never have C ⊥. By the definition of forcing, vs ¬ϕ means that C vs ⊥ whenever C vs ϕ, i.e., that C vs ϕ is absurd. By the definition of forcing (using transitivity of covers for the iterated existential quantification), C vs ϕ means that for some U C we have, for all f : D → C in U , which implies E vs ⊥, so by the definition of forcing, E has an empty cover. This conflicts with ( ). Note that we have crucially used a substitution that is not injective. This means that for rn the situation is completely different. We prove rn ¬¬ϕ by showing that every condition can be extended to a condition in which ϕ is forced. Let C be a condition and let D denote the extension of C with two new variables x, y and corresponding atoms P (x), P (y). Since D rn P (x) ∧ P (y) it suffices to show that D rn ¬∀z. (Q(x, z) ∨ R(y, z)).
Let g : E → D and assume E rn ∀z. (Q(x, z) ∨ R(y, z)). This situation is contradictory for a subtle reason. If E would extend D with the atom x = y, then there would be no contradiction at all. However, the language has no equality. If we would have g(x) = g(y), then again there would be no contradiction at all. However, g must be injective. It turns out that a contradiction is inevitable under the given conditions. Like in Example 6.3, extending E with a new variable z leads to a condition F that cannot possibly force Q(x, z) ∨ R(y, z) (for simplicity of notation we assume that all renamings are implemented as injections). We must reason carefully since the theory T contains one axiom, and we can force both Q(x, z) ∨ R(x, z) and Q(y, z) ∨ R(y, z). The intuition is that this gives four possibilities, one of which, Q(y, z) ∧ R(x, z), does not force Q(x, z) ∨ R(y, z). Since F rn Q(x, z) ∨ R(y, z) requires a U F such that for all g : G → F in U , either G rn Q(x, z) or G rn R(y, z), we arrive at a contradiction (formally, we argue by induction on U F ). Lemma 6.4 gives a coherent theory T and a sentence ¬ϕ that is forced in vs and hence, by Theorem 4.3, is true in the generic model of T = . Then, of course, ¬¬ϕ is false in this model. At the same time, the lemma states that ¬¬ϕ is forced in rn . Hence, by the interplay between soundness and coherent completeness (Corollary 5.9), ¬¬ϕ is T -redundant, as explained in the Introduction.
At first sight, this theory T and sentence ¬¬ϕ seem to answer Wraith's question cited in the introduction. However, there is subtle catch here: Wraith's question has been posed in the context of logic with equality, and rn ¬¬ϕ has been shown in a logic without equality. Moreover, as pointed out in the proof of Lemma 6.4, it is essential for rn ¬¬ϕ that equality is not in the language. To answer Wraith's question properly, we have to show that ¬¬ϕ is T -redundant in intuitionistic logic with equality. But this follows from our improved completeness result, Theorem 5.11, because for a relational signature, T + is the same as T = .
Concluding remarks and open problems
We have presented three simple and natural syntactic forcing models for coherent logic, that do not presuppose that the logic has equality. In a future paper we shall characterize each of their sheaf toposes as the classifing topos of a certain extension of the coherent theory T . We have already seen a glimpse of this in Theorem 5.11, because Sh(C ts , T ) is the classifying topos of T + . As an application of our forcing models we have given in Section 6 a coherent theory T and a sentence ϕ which is T -redundant, yet false in the generic model of T in logic with equality. This answers in the negative a question by Wraith.
The above example uses predicates other than equality and uses that logic with equality is conservative over logic without equality. This leads us to the second open problem, which is the refinement of Wraith's question for algebraic coherent theories. Given an algebraic (= purely equational) coherent theory T , are all T -redundant sentences true in the generic model of T ?
